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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW.

TAXATION-ESTATE TAX-TRANSFERS TAKING EFFECT AT DEATHDoCTRlN_E-In 1925 and 1926 decedent and his wife created
two trusts, decedent contributing 80 per cent, and his wife 20 per cent.
Each trust provided for incom_e to the wife during decedent's life, and on his
death income was to be divided between the wife and a daughter or go to the
survivor for life. On the death. of the survivor of the wife and daughter the
corpus was to be distributed "According to the Statutes of descent and distribution of the State of Ohio, to the heirs at law of [decedent] and [wife], providing the heirs of [decedent] and [wife] are the same persons. Should
[ the decedent and wife] leave no lineal descendants of their direct line, and
the next of kin of each were collaterals then said trust fund shall up·on termination of this trust be distributed ••• to the collaterals of [ the decedent and wife
ratably] ." There were no reservations of powers by the decedent or his wife.
On the death of the decedent the collector imposed and the executor paid a deficiency assessment on the corpus of the trusts. The executor's claim for refund
was refused and he sued in the federal district court to recover. The district
court held that the value of the property transferred into the trusts by the
decedent was includible in decedent's taxable estate under -section 8 l l ( c) of the
Internal Revenue Code as a transfer "intended to take effect in possession or
enjoyment at or after his death." On appeal, held, affirmed. Beach v. Busey,
(C.C.A. 6th, 1946) 156 F. (2d) 496.
The confusion and inconsistencies in reasoning found in the United States
Tax Court's and the circuit courts' opinions in this :field are excellent indications
of the fact that all of the implications of the Hallock 1 doctrine are not yet clear,
and the opinion in the principal case supports such a conclusion. It is felt by
writers who have made a careful analysis of the decision in the Hallock case and
the decisions on which it was based 2 that two, or possibly three, elements
( depending upon th_eit classification), must be present in order to invoke the
doctrine of the Hallock case and thus subject a trust to inclusion in the settlor's
taxable estate.8 The elements are: the creation of a reversion or a possibility of
H~LOCK

Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 60 S.Ct. 444 (1940).
Klein v. United States, 283 U.S. 231, 51 S.Ct. 398 (193I); Helvering v.
St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U.S. 39, 56 S.Ct. 74 (1935); Becker v. St. Louis
Union Trust Co., 296 U.S. 48, 56 S.Ct. 78 (1935).
8 PAUL, FEDERAL EsTATE AND GIFT TAXATION (1946 Supp.),·§ 7.23 at 194;
Eisenstein, "The Hallock Problem," 58 HARV. ·L. REv. 1141 (1945); MONTGOMERY,
FEDERAL TAXES ON ESTATES, TRUSTS AND GIFTS 1945-46, p. 403.
1
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reverter in the settlor at the time th,e trust is set up, the extinction of that interest
at his death, and the enlarging of the estate of another by his death. This might
be called the original or conventional interpretation. This is the most conservative interpretation of the doctrin_e, and was adopted by the Treasury Regulations
at that time as the test to be applied in subjecting a trust to taxation.4 However,
the government soon indicated that on the basis of its interpretation of the case
the test for inclusion of the corpus of a trust in a taxable estate was the first
element alone, i.e., the existence of a reversion or possibility of reverter.5 Recently the Treasury has taken the position that the .element to be stressed is the
requirement that the taker survive the settlor, though it does make mention of
the interest of the decedent as a requirement. 6 Thus a court may follow any
one of three interpretations in reaching a decision. Consequently, the court in
the principal case may find some justification for its broad interpretation of the
doctrine based on its analysis of the Goldstone case 7 or for the standard it
appears to set up as a basis for testing the facts of the principal case.8 However,
it is submitted that the decision can well be justified on the basis of the conservative interpretation and such an approach appears to be preferable to the one
actually used.9 It is clear from an analysis of the contingencies which might have
arisen during the decedent's life that he possessed a possibility of reverter. It
was possible that the wife and daughter might have predeceased him and that
he would outlive all of the common heirs ( which the court construed to mean
lineal descendants of the marriage ),1° and all persons who might be his heirs
at law-a very remote possibility, but sufficient to constitute the first element
of the doctrine. It was also possible that he might survive the wife, or that they
might be divorced, and that he would remarry and have children. Then should
there be a failure of common heirs the children of the subsequent marriage, who
would be his lineal descendants, would be next of kin superior to his collateral
heirs. On occupying that status they would prevent the collaterals from taking,
since the condition set forth in trust instrument, namely, that next of kin should
be collateral heirs, would not be satisfied, inasmuch as the next of kin in this
Regulation 105, § 81.17 prior to amendment by TJ) 5512 dated May 1, 1946.
Eisenstein, "The Hallock Problem," 58 HARV. L. REv. 1141 at u46 (1945);
PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION (1946 Supp.) 194.
6
Regulation 105, § 81.17 as amended by TD 5512 dated May 1, 1946.
1
Goldstone v. United States, 325 U.S. 687 at 692, 65 S.Ct. 1323 (1945).
The court considered the essential element to be "the decedent's possession of a
reversionary interest at the time of his death," but in so doing, it neglected the important qualifying clause of the sentence which read, "delaying until then the determination of the ultimate possession or enjoyment of the property."
8
This standard appears to be set out in the following language: "The problem
posed for us in the present appeal is whether by the terms of two trust instruments •••
all possibility of reversion of interest therein upon any contingency, was successfully
excluded." Principal case at 497.
9
Supra, note 8.
10
Principal case at 499.
4
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case· would be lineal descendants. Ther:efore, there would be a failure of takers
and the corpus would revert to his estate. Again it is a case of a very remote
possibility, but sufficient to constitute the first required element. In each of these
situations the settlor's death cuts off the possibility of reverter by termination of
the contingencies; and it enlarges the interests of the takers because his death
before his wife's would set the outer limit of the class of common heirs, and her
death before his would allow his death to ripen the beneficiaries' interests. Thus
the second required element ( or second and third depending upon their classification) is present, and the Hallock doctrine can therefore be invoked. By refer_ence
to this interpretation, rather than one based on the possibility of reverter alone,
or the element of survivorship alone, the d_ecision escapes the criticism that has
been leveled at the Tax Court and certain of the circuit courts for misinterpreting the Hallock case.11 It is interesting to note that since the trust effected a
distribution to the settlor's "heirs," the court considered the possibility of the
existence of a reversionary interest in the settlor, by reference to the doctrine
of worthier title.12 However, the court did not base its decision on the existence
of a reversion. It is submitted that the court followed a sound course in this
respect since the doctrine of worthier title applies only when a grantor attempts
to create a remainder in his heirs. Such was not the case here because the remainder was to the common heirs of two persons; therefore the doctrine is not
applicable.18 In any event, the question may be raised whether a reversion to a
settlor resulting from application of the doctrine of another title is not more
properly taxable under section 8 l l (a) •14
John W. Riehm

11

Supra, note 5.

u PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, § 314 ( l 940); SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS, § § 144-

148 (1936).
18 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, § 314c (1940).
14 It seems that a reversion, which is a vested interest, should be included in a
decedent's taxable estate under 8 II (a) as is all other property subject to probate. Yet
the· government has argued, and the Tax Court has held, in Estate of Bertha Low,
z T.C. 1n4 (1943), affirmed, (C.C.A. zd, 1944) 145 F. (zd) 832, that the trust
is subject to taxation under 8II(c). The only apparent explanation for the government's argument is that the Supreme Court has never made a clear pronouncement of
what is to be the basis for determining value in this situation. The result is that the
commissioner subjects the corpus of the trust, minus the value of the outstanding life
estate, to taxation under 8n(c). But if he were to proceed under 8II(a) the only
thing he could tax would be the value of the reversion held by the decedent, based on
actuarial tables, and this would be small compared to the value of the corpus minus
the outstanding life estate. See Everett, ''Valuation of a 'Possibility of Reverter' Under
the Hallock Case," 18 TAXES 6II (1940).

